Hazardous material transportation policy and the threat of terrorist attack by Matthews, James R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-06
Hazardous material transportation policy and the
threat of terrorist attack
Matthews, James R.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5875
 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 




HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND 









 Thesis Advisor:     Donald Eaton 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection 
of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters 
Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 
blank)            
2.   REPORT DATE   
June 2002 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Hazardous Material Transportation Policy 
and the Threat of Terrorist Attack 
5.  FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6.  AUTHOR (S) James R. Matthews  
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a.  DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis analyzes the framework criteria constructed from policies followed 
by manufacturers, suppliers, and Department of Defense (DOD) on the transportation of 
hazardous material. Field interviews were conducted with base civilian and military 
personnel involved in the support of hazardous material operations.  
Overall policies on transportation of hazardous material do provide adequate 
security for naval bases but some inefficiency do exist.  There is a lack of 
designated hazardous material transportation routes on base; hazardous material 
instructions lacks specifics on transporting hazardous material before it becomes 
waste; and gate security lacks procedures or systems for to check incoming carriers 
licenses for authorization to transport hazardous material.  
Recommendations include the establishment of hazardous material routes; 
incorporate specifics on transporting incoming hazardous material; establish 
communications with law enforcement systems to check carrier’s licenses for 
authorization to transport hazardous material; and base security plans should 
incorporate exercises and training plans pertaining to possible terrorists attacks 
with hazardous material. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   transportation of hazardous material, hazardous 
material regulations, and terrorists attacks with hazardous material 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
49 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500                                          Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)   
















































Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




James R. Matthews 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Norfolk State University, 1992 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
 
from the  
 



















Douglas A. Brook, Dean 























































This thesis analyzes the framework criteria 
constructed from policies followed by manufacturers, 
suppliers, and Department of Defense (DOD) on the 
transportation of hazardous material. Field interviews were 
conducted with base civilian and military personnel 
involved in the support of hazardous material operations.  
Overall policies on transportation of hazardous 
material do provide adequate security for naval bases but 
some inefficiency do exist.  There is a lack of designated 
hazardous material transportation routes on base; hazardous 
material instructions lacks specifics on transporting 
hazardous material before it becomes waste; and gate 
security lacks procedures or systems for to check incoming 
carriers licenses for authorization to transport hazardous 
material.  
Recommendations include the establishment of hazardous 
material routes; incorporate specifics on transporting 
incoming hazardous material; establish communications with 
law enforcement systems to check carrier’s licenses for 
authorization to transport hazardous material; and base 
security plans should incorporate exercises and training 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Hazardous materials are essential to the economy of 
the United Sates and the well being of its people.  
Hazardous materials fuel cars and trucks, and heat and cool 
homes and offices.  They also are used for farming and 
medical applications and in manufacturing, mining, and 
other industrial processes.  Millions of tons of explosive, 
poisonous, corrosive, flammable, and radioactive materials 
are transported every day.  Planes, trains, trucks, and sea 
going vessels move hazardous materials in quantities 
ranging from several ounces to many thousands of gallons.  
The vast majority of hazardous material shipments arrive 
safely at their destinations.  Most incidents that occur 
involve small releases of material and present no serious 
threat to life or property. 
However, in the wrong hands, hazardous materials can 
pose a significant security threat.  Hazardous materials in 
transport are particularly vulnerable to sabotage or 
misuse, because they are frequently transported in 
substantial quantities and in proximity to large population 
centers. These materials are often clearly identified to 
ensure safe and appropriate handling during transport and 
to facilitate effective emergency response in the event of 
an accidental release.  However, despite the fact that 
Hazardous Material Regulations provide for a high degree of 
safety with respect to unintentional release during 
transport, these regulations do not specifically address 
security threats. 
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Since September 11, 2001, there has been great concern 
about terrorists’ ability to fraudulently obtain licenses 
to haul hazardous material.  Such a scenario would give 
terrorists the ability to seize control over trucks and 
railcars full of hazardous material and turn them into 
weapons of mass destruction.  One major reason for this 
concern is according to The Federal Society for Law and 
Public Studies shortly after the terrorist attacks against 
the United States on September 11, 2001, twenty people were 
arrested for fraudulently obtaining license to haul 
hazardous material. Some members in the group arrested were 
suspected of having links to the terrorist that launched 
the attacks of September 11th.  The license held gave them 
authorizations to haul hazardous material including 
dynamite, gases, and toxic and radioactive materials.1   
Many Americans could not image an airplane becoming a 
weapon of mass destruction.  However, tragedies such as 
September 11th proved that it could happen.  These tragedies 
open the eyes of many leaders of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and brought about concerns on how they handle 
transportation of hazardous onto their installations.  
B. PROBLEM 
Currently, many naval bases are outsourcing hazardous 
material operations (i.e., procurement of hazardous 
material from commercial sources for on base delivery). DOD 
has been undertaking many ways to save money on the 
operation support services for naval installations.  The 
emphasis on outsourcing came from the Clinton’s 
Administration’s National Performance Review and the 
                    
1 DOT Website. 
  3 
ongoing Defense Reform Initiative, including outsourcing 
recommendations from two DOD study group.2     
In 1995, the report of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommended that all commercial activities 
in DOD be outsourced, and that all the new needs be 
channeled through the private sector.3 
The problem for naval installations is through 
outsourcing their hazardous material requirements are being 
transported onto naval bases via commercial carriers with 
civilian drivers.  These commercial carriers are vulnerable 
to possible terrorist hijacking.  If a truck load of 
hazardous material for delivery to a on base hazardous 
material center was hijacked by a terrorist would it be 
detected in transit or by base security before it gets to 
its final destination for mass destruction?  Do current 
hazardous material transportation polices provide adequate 
base security from terrorist attacks with these types of 
materials?  
It is important to protect bases from possible 
terrorists attacks with hazardous material.  The framework 
criteria for transportation of hazardous material must be 
constructed from manufacturers, suppliers, and compare to 
current DOD polices to ensure adequate security measures 
are in place to prevent or handle possible terrorist 
attacks. 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
We analyze the framework constructed from 
manufacturers, suppliers, and DOD transportation polices on 
                    
2 GAO/NSIAD. 
3 GAO/NSIAD. 
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the movement of hazardous material to naval bases. Then 
evaluate the framework constructed against Naval Air 
Station LeMoore polices.  The objective to analyze the 
framework constructed against current polices and evaluate 
whether these polices provide adequate base security from 
possible terrorist attacks with hazardous material.  
We draw conclusions about the adequacy of current 
hazardous material transportation policy to provide 
adequate base security.  We also make recommendations for 
improvements in the transportation of hazardous material 
policy.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
First, we construct framework criteria from 
manufacturers and suppliers polices on transportation of 
hazardous material.  We imply framework criteria as meaning 
similarities among guidance provide by both organizations 
that should be followed when transporting hazardous 
material for delivery to naval installations.   
Second, we evaluate Department of Defense policy on 
transportation of hazardous material against the framework 
contrasted from manufacturers and suppliers.  Then, review 
similarities in framework and construct criteria for the 
transportation of hazardous material.   
Third, we evaluate Naval Air Station LeMoore hazardous 
material management operations policies and base security 
polices on the transportation of hazardous material against 
the framework constructed.  
Finally, we state our conclusions on whether polices 
in place provide adequate security from terrorist attacks.  
Then, we make recommendations for possible changes in 
  5 
hazardous material transportation policies for naval 
installations.  
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II. FRAMEWORK CRITERIA ON HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
TRANSPORTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ransom House Unabridged dictionary defines framework 
as a skeletal structure designed to support something.  In 
reference to the framework criteria of hazardous material 
transportation, we imply it as standard guidelines or 
policy followed by manufacturers, suppliers, and DOD when 
transporting hazardous material to its final destination.  
These polices will assist in the safe delivery of hazardous 
material to naval bases.  In addition, assist in security 
measures while in transit from possible hijacking by 
terrorist groups trying to do harm to the United States.    
To evaluate these policies we analyze policy from the 
manufacturer to the supplier; supplier to naval 
installation; naval base security gate to the hazardous 
material receiving center.  
We look at the source of where hazardous material 
enters the transportation pipeline to construct a framework 
that is common among all involved in transporting these 
materials. 
B. TRANSPORTING FROM MANUFACTURER TO SUPPLIER 
In preventing possible terrorist attacks we must 
evaluate polices of were hazardous material starts in the 
process of transporting.  Transportation of hazardous 
material has many requirements and restrictions for 
manufacturers.  Manufacturers of hazardous material must 
follow the Federal Hazardous Material Transportation Laws 
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by Department of Transportation prior to any hazardous 
material being transported to a supplier.4  
1. Training 
Manufacturer’s requires for their employees to have 
some training in the proper handling of hazardous material.  
This training is important for personnel to be aware of 
what they are handling and the precautions necessary to 
prevent any safety violation or possible environmental 
mishap.  
2. Markings and Labeling 
Manufacturers require all containers being prepared 
for shipping to their suppliers be properly sealed, labeled 
and correctly marked.  The proper shipping name and 
identification number is marked on the outside of the 
container. In addition, all hazardous materials is 
accompanied with a Material Safety Data Sheet that provides 
detailed descriptions of the ingredients, side affects, 
precautions, flash points, and etc.    
In addition, all technical names of hazardous material 
are marked in parentheses, in association with the proper 
shipping name, in accordance with the requirements and 
exceptions specified for display of technical descriptions 
on the shipping papers to prevent confusion. 
3. Consignee or Consignor 
Manufacturers require the consignee’s or consignor’s 
name and address.  Each person transporting hazardous 
material shall mark that package with the name and address 
of the consignor or consignee. This will assist in tracking 
of any possible hijacked hazardous material in transit to 
the supplier. 
                    
4 HMTA. 
  9 
4. Shipping Papers 
Manufacturers provide carriers with shipping 
documentation while in transit for identification and 
authorization to haul hazardous material. This 
documentation will be required if the carrier is stopped by 
law enforcement or for tolls while transporting these 
material. 
5. Placards 
Manufacturers ensure their carrier’s vehicles have the 
proper placard displayed when in-transit for security 
measures.  This will help prevent delay in delivering the 
material to its final destination. 
6. Emergency Response Information 
Manufacturers provide emergency response information 
to their carriers during transit.  Emergency response 
information is defined as information that can be used in 
the mitigation of an incident involving hazardous 
materials.  For example, the basic description and 
technical name of the hazardous material being transported, 
immediate hazards to health, and the initial methods for 
handling spills or leaks in the absence of fire. 
C. SUPPLIER TO NAVAL INSTALLATION 
The concern is how suppliers can ensure that hazardous 
materials are secure during storage and in transit.  
Suppliers of hazardous material adhere to transportation 
policies, as do manufacturers when supplying customers 
their products.  All suppliers or private companies who 
procure commercial transportation services for delivery of 
their products are considered engaged in commerce and 
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required to comply with the 49 Code of Federal Regulations.  
Suppliers polices incorporate these regulations.5   
1. Labels and Containers 
Suppliers require all hazardous material be maintained 
in its original packaging or containers.  All labels and 
markings from the manufacturer on the containers should 
still be intact and readable.  This will easily help verify 
what is being transported to a customer. 
2. Registration Certificate 
Suppliers require all their carriers have a valid 
Registration Certificates authorizing them to transport 
hazardous material. The registration certificate includes a 
Department of Transportation registration number.  The 
carrier displays the registration number on the vehicle 
transporting the hazardous material.  The certificate will 
assist law enforcement personnel in determining whether a 
carrier is a legitimate transporter of hazardous materials.   
3. Shipping Papers 
Suppliers require shipping documentation.  Shipping 
documentation must accompany the hazardous material being 
transported.  The proper shipping name and identification 
number of the hazardous material being transported must be 
listed on all documentation.  The shipping documentation 
will continue to assist in identifying the hazardous 
material during transit to its final destination. 
4. Placards 
Supplier’s vehicles display the proper hazardous 
material placard during transit.  These placards help the 
public and law enforcements identify possible hazards 
during transit. 
                    
5 DOT Website. 
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D. NAVAL BASE SECURITY GATE TO HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CENTER 
When transporting hazardous material on naval 
installations, prevention of terrorist threats should begin 
at the entrance. Gate security requirements should be clear 
and strict. 
1. Proper Decal and Identification 
Many naval installations have civilian or military 
security personnel.  In order for carriers of supplies to 
gain entrance on to naval installations a proper decal or 
identification are required.  This information helps keep 
prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the 
facilities. 
2. Vehicle Inspections 
Security personnel are required to check all vehicles 
transporting hazardous material thoroughly.  They used the 
shipping documentation to verify the contents in the truck 
or vehicle.  In addition, inspected for any unusual 
characteristics or of possible explosives. They ensure the 
labels and markings of the hazardous material being 
transported are intact and clearly visible.  This 
inspection will assist in preventing any material being 
transport that does not agree with the shipping 
documentation can be turned away. 
3. Routes 
Upon completion of security personnel inspection and 
approval granted, base security directs the carriers to the 
proper route for delivery of the hazardous material to its 
final destination.   
E. ON-BASE HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RECEIVING CENTER 
Most naval bases have centralized their hazardous 
material operations.  These services are also offered to 
  12 
ships assigned to the base as their homeport. Over the past 
years, these support services—as well as the hazardous 
material inventory—have grown immensely.  However, recently 
many base hazardous material centers have adopt the 
initiative to reduce their inventory to the minimum 
required by its customer.  This will help reduce the 
possible destruction a large amount of hazardous material 
inventory could cause if targeted by terrorist. 
1. Shipping Papers 
Hazardous material personnel are responsible for 
ensuring that all shipping documentation of the material 
received matches what was actually ordered.  This will 
prevent the receipt of unwanted or unauthorized hazardous 
materials. 
2. Location of Receiving Center 
The hazardous material receiving center should not be 
located near explosives or base aircraft.  If so, this 
brings great concern about potential mass destruction if a 
terrorist hijacks a truck loaded with hazardous chemicals 
and gains entrance on to base. 
3. Emergency Procedures and Routes 
Emergency procedures and routes for transporting 
hazardous material should be established and training 
conducted periodically for possible terrorist attacks.  If 
not, there is a potential for a breakdown in communications 
that causes a loss of lives and destruction in case of an 
emergency threat.  
4. Storage 
Bases storage of hazardous material inventory is 
normally secure.  Normally it is required to be stored in a 
safe environment that prohibits unauthorized personnel 
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entry.  All labels and markings are clearly visible and 
hazardous material stored in their original container or 
shipping package.  All non-compatible hazardous material is 
stored in a separate area to prevent an accidental mixture 
that could cause an explosion, fire, or some other chemical 
reaction.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, as well as subsequent threats related to biological 
and other hazardous materials, we must undertake a broad 
review of the government's and industry's hazardous 
materials transportation safety and security programs and 
policies.  This review should ensure that the framework 
criteria established for transportation of hazardous 
material from where it enters the transportation pipeline 
at the manufacturer to its final destination, are adequate 
to prevent possible terrorist attacks.     
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III. DOD RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF 
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The National defense strategy of the United States 
requires a national transportation system that is fully 
responsive and capable of meeting military personnel and 
material movement requirements of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) in peacetime, national emergencies and wartime.  This 
strategy requires a proper mix among the capabilities of 
the various modes and methods of transportation, both 
military and commercial—a mix that matches defense 
requirements and security measures.6 
The objective of the Hazardous Material Transportation 
Act (HMTA) of 1975, according to policy stated by Congress, 
is to improve regulatory and enforcement authority of the 
Secretary of Transportation to protect the Nation 
adequately against risks to life and property, which are 
inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in 
commerce. The HMTA empowered the Secretary of 
Transportation to designate as hazardous material any 
particular quality or form of a material that may pose an 
unreasonable risk to health and safety or property.7   
We evaluate the framework criteria that have been 
established by the Department of Defense of on the 
transportation of hazardous materials. 
Department of Defense (DOD) obtains majority of its 
guidance from the Department of Transportation (DOT).  When 
                    
6 DOT Website. 
7 HMTA. 
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establishing policy and both departments evaluate the types 
of transportation security threats on transporting 
hazardous materials.  According to both some of the types 
of threats from terrorist are endangerment of populations; 
disruption of the US economy by disrupting the 
transportation network; disruption of military shipments; 
and loss of confidence by the public in transportation 
systems.  These are major concerns by both parties and 
establishing and monitoring strict guidance on 
transportation is very important. 
Many regulations DOD incorporates in their guidance 
come from several sources.  These include the Storage and 
Handling of HAZMAT (DLAM 4145.11), Defense Transportation 
Regulation (DoD 4500.9R), preparing HAZMAT for Military Air 
Shipments (AFJMAN 24-204), 40 CFR environmental (HAZWASTE), 
29 CFR OSHA hazard communications standard, Emergency 
Response Guidebook, and the Defense Transportation 
Regulation.   
OSHA law 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) requires procedures on 
hazardous material in the work place, as well as on 
containers of chemicals being shipped to other work places; 
preparation and distribution of material safety data sheets 
to employees and downstream employers; and development and 
implementation of employee training programs regarding 
hazardous of chemicals and protective measures. The Defense 
Transportation Regulation (DOD 4500.9R), chapter 204, 
contains policies, procedures, and responsibilities 
applicable to movement of hazardous material by all modes 
of commercial transportation and military surface 
transportation operated by military and DoD civilian 
  17 
personnel.  Theater CINCs may apply more stringent 
requirements.  Policies, procedures, and responsibilities 
applicable to movement of hazardous materials by military 
air shipment are identified in AFJMAN 24-204.     
There are abundant regulations on hazardous material 
that must be followed but we focus on the transportation 
requirements. DOD requirements begin with the training of 
all personnel who handle hazardous materials. 
B. HANDLING CRITERIA 
According to Federal Hazardous Material Transportation 
Law, DOD requirements when handling hazardous material 
include a minimum number of personnel; minimum levels of 
training and qualifications for personnel; the kind and 
frequency of inspections; equipment for detecting, warning 
of, and controlling risks posed by the hazardous material.8 
These are initial requirements to increase personnel 
awareness levels when handling hazardous material. 
C. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS  
DOD regulation requires hazardous material employers 
provide hazardous material employees with training in the 
safe loading, unloading, handling, and storing of hazardous 
material, as well as in emergency preparedness for 
responding to an accident or incident involving the 
spillage or leakage of hazardous material.9   
After completing the training, each hazardous material 
employer must certify, by proper documentation, that his or 
her employees have been trained and tested on appropriate 
responsibilities.  For example, an employee maybe certified 
                    
8 DOT Website. 
9 DOD Website. 
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in the general handling procedures, loading and unloading 
techniques and strategies to reduce probability of release 
or damage during transport.  This helps protect the 
employer and employees from possible criminal penalties or 
fines in case of a mishap with hazardous material  
D. LABELING REQUIREMENTS 
DOD requires all hazardous being transported be 
labeled properly.10  The label requires the proper shipping 
name and identification number.  These labels are affix on 
the outside of the container or packaging of hazardous 
material being transported. Any previous labeled container 
or package requires relabeling. These labels assist’s 
personnel on what type of material they are transporting or 
handling during transit.      
E. MODES OF TRANSPORTING  
Hazardous Material is transported by four modes of 
transportation: highway, rail, vessel, and air.  Different 
agents regulate enforcement for each mode of 
transportation.  For example, the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), regulates highway routing of 
hazardous materials and highway safety permits; the United 
States Coast Guard, regulates functions for hazardous 
material include bulk transport by vessel; the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA); and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FRR).  
In addition, according to the Hazardous Material 
Transportation Act, regulations apply to any person who 
transports, causes to be transported, or ships a hazardous 
material.11  This act does not exempt anyone who 
                    
10 DOD Website. 
11 HMTA. 
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manufactures, fabricates, marks, maintains, reconditions, 
repairs, or tests a package or container that is 
represented, marked, certified, or sold by such person for 
use in the commercial transportation of certain hazardous 
materials. 
We focus on DOD transportation policy on transporting 
via highway.  DOD contracts carriers for the transportation 
of their hazardous material to naval installations.  These 
carriers are required to have valid license to haul 
hazardous materials. The license or registration 
certificates are registered with United States Department 
of Transportation authorizing them to transport hazardous 
material.  These certificates are issued a DOT hazardous 
material registration number.  The carrier displays the DOT 
number on their shipping documents being carried.  The 
registration certificates assists DOD and state and local 
law enforcement in determining whether a carrier’s license 
is valid.   
F. PENALTIES 
A person who knowingly violates the Federal HAZMAT 
Transportation Law is liable to the United States 
Government for a civil penalty, which can range from $250 
to $27,500 per incident and per day.12  This penalty is 
applied when a person acts knowingly commits the violation 
or when a reasonable person exercising reasonable care 
under the circumstances would have that knowledge.   
If violators are found criminally liable, their 
criminal penalty for the intent to harm is up to five years 
                    
12 49 CFR. 
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in prison and a fine of $250,000 to $500,000.13  The 
certifying personnel are personally liable for the fines. 
For the Navy, these are Commanding Officers and department 
heads afloat.  A list of offenses and fines are contained 
in the 49 CFR.  
G. ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS 
The Research and Special Programs Administration 
(RSPA) issues Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR).  RSPA 
also issues procedural and registration regulations.  Its 
functions include: issuing rules and regulations governing 
the safe transportation of Hazardous Material; issuing, 
renewing, modifying, and terminating exemptions; issuing, 
modifying, and terminating approvals for specific 
activities; and receiving and maintaining important 
records.14  
H. REPORTING 
The Secretary of Transportation has designated a toll-
free telephone number that transporters of hazardous 
material and other individuals can use to report possible 
violations of CFR 49 or any order or regulation under the 
Federal law.  In addition, State and local governments have 
their violation-reporting systems. 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
DOD incorporates many policies in their instructions 
pertaining to the transportation of hazardous material.  
The numerous laws and regulations that must be followed and 
stiff personal penalties for violations are abundant and 
sometimes hard to follow.  However, we must ensure that the 
                    
13 49 CFR. 
14 DOT Website. 
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framework constructed from manufacturers, suppliers, and 
DOD is adequate for base security.    
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE FRAMEWORK CRITERIA 
We looked at the different polices that manufactures, 
suppliers, and Department of Defense follow to assist in 
the safe transport of hazardous material from its origin to 
its final destination.  From these polices we construct a 
framework criteria that may be implemented by all involved 
in transporting hazardous material.  The framework consists 
of four main areas: definitions of hazardous material and 
its priorities; personnel; material identification and 
tracking; and security during physical movement. 
A. DEFINITION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL  
Hazardous materials are substances that may pose an 
unreasonable risk to health and safety or property.  
Including in these categories are explosives, radioactive 
material, etiologic agent, flammable or combustible liquid 
or solid, poison, oxidizing or corrosive material, and 
compressed gas.  
B. PERSONNEL 
1. Pre-Employment Screening 
Background checks should be conducted for personnel 
that are employed for handling or transporting hazardous 
material. 
2. License for Transporting 
All personnel transporting hazardous material should 
have registered license with the DOT authorizing their 
transport of hazardous material.  Plus, the licenses should 
be registered with the state it’s being transported in. 
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3. Training 
Personnel working with hazardous material should have 
a minimum training in hazardous material operations.  For 
example, they should know the proper handling procedures 
and what precautions to take in case have a spill or leak. 
C. MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING 
1. Labeling and Packaging 
Hazardous material should be properly containerized or 
packaged prior to transportation to prevent leakage or 
spillage to the environment. 
2. Accountability 
Hazardous material containers or packaging should have 
the proper shipping name and identification number 
displayed on them.  Technical names should be in 
parentheses in association with the proper shipping name.  
In addition, consignee’s or consignor’s name and address 
should be on the hazardous material if the shipment 
transfers from more than one carrier to its delivery point.    
3. Tracking 
Hazardous material requires shipping documentation for 
tracking purposes. Shipping documentation require the 
description of the hazardous material being carrier and its 
quantities.  Plus, carriers are required to display 
placards of the hazardous being transported.  Transporters 
are to have their register certificates authorizing them to 
transport hazardous material.  
D. PHYSICAL MOVEMENT 
1. Transportation Planning 
When transporting hazardous material safety routes 
must be taken in account during planning.  There should be 
main and alternative routes to a carrier’s delivery point. 
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2. En Route Communication 
Transporters should have communications with their 
base office during transit.  
3. Communication with Public Safety Agencies.  
Carriers should have communications or telephone 
numbers of emergency personnel in case of an accident or 
mishap at while in transit. 
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V. NAVAL STATION LEMOORE, CALIFORNIA 
A. OVERVIEW 
Naval Station LeMoore hazardous material and waste 
operations responsibilities are divided between base Supply 
department, Public Works Environmental Management Division 
(EMD), Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office, and base 
security.  The Supply department handles the incoming 
hazardous material from initial procurement to storage and 
the distribution to the base squadrons.  In addition, they 
ensure manufacturers and suppliers properly label hazardous 
material and provide material safety data sheets prior to 
shipment. Also, monitor squadron’s usage and ensure the 
maximum three-day limit is not exceeded. Once the hazardous 
material becomes hazardous waste EMD hazardous waste office 
assist in the collection of the waste.  EMD prepares the 
waste for transportation to DRMO.  DROM collects the waste 
from EMD and utilizes a contractor for disposal.15  
These office works together to ensure a safe 
environment is maintain from hazardous materials and waste.  
However, the main policy and written instructions apply 
ninety-five percent towards proper management of hazardous 
waste.      
We constructed framework criteria from the 
manufacturers, suppliers, and DOD policies on transporting 
hazardous material from its initial start in the 
transportation pipeline to final destination.  We use this 
framework criteria to analyze Naval Station LeMoore polices 
on transporting hazardous material from outside sources.  
                    
15 NASLEMINST 5090.4B. 
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We look at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats for NAS LeMoore in reference to the framework 
constructed.   
B. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS 
1. Strengths 
a. Hazardous Material/Waste Management Policy 
Naval Station LeMoore hazardous waste management 
instructions are very detailed covering all aspects once 
hazardous material becomes waste.  
b. Better Active Duty and Civilian 
Relationships 
Working together in support functions builds 
solid relations among hazardous material management offices 
to operate overall more efficiently.  The relationships 
developed internal support functions should enable them to 
obtain increased efficiencies in many other areas of 
hazardous material operations. 
c. Base Entrance Security Checks 
NAS LeMoore gate sentry checks identification of 
all vehicles entering the base.  This will assist in 
preventing unauthorized personnel entering the base. 
d. Hazardous Material and Waste Storage 
Locations 
Incoming hazardous is stored in the supple 
warehouse on base until distributed to squadrons for 
utilization.  Then generated hazardous waste is collected 
and transported to a separate location from hazardous 
material.  Both warehouse locations are not in the 
proximity of the main population buildings where majority 
of personnel work. 
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2. Weaknesses 
a. En-route Written Procedures or Policy on 
Incoming Hazardous Material 
There was no system or means for base security to 
check carriers of incoming hazardous material vehicles 
license for that authorization the transport of hazardous 
material.  The normal gate identification checks were 
conducted for vehicles. 
b. Alternative Routes 
There were no written or alternatives routes 
established for transporting incoming hazardous material. 
c. Hazardous Material Transportation Policy 
There is no written base policy in transporting 
hazardous material on base during delivery from commercial 
carriers.  For example, BOC Gas Company is a commercial 
that delivers to naval bases. 
3. Opportunities 
There is always ways for improvement in safe guarding 
base installations from possible terrorist attacks. 
However, many prevention measures that are overlooked 
sometimes could of prevented mass destruction.  
Constructing framework criteria from manufacturers, 
suppliers, and DOD could assist in the safe guard of base 
installation in areas overlooked.        
4. Threats 
a. Use of Shipments of Hazardous Material 
The principal terrorist threat is to the 
population for the mass destruction and maximum loss of 
life. 
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b. En Route Hijacking 
Easy targets for terrorist are terminals or 
warehouses where shipments are stored or transferred by 
small carriers. 
c. Unauthorized Licenses 
Obtaining fraudulent licenses to haul or 
transport hazardous material is a great concern by 
government since the September 11th tragedy.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
We conducted research to support this thesis by 
evaluating policies on transportation of hazardous 
material.  We addressed the policies on transportation of 
hazardous material that manufacturers, suppliers, and 
Department of Defense utilizes.  The main focus and 
objective of this thesis was to evaluate whether 
transportation policies provide adequacy for base security 
from threats of terrorist using hazardous material as 
weapons of mass destruction.  
We conclude in this chapter the conclusions and 
recommendations for transportation policies for naval 
bases.  These finding and recommendations come from 
analyzing policies on transportation of hazardous material, 
meetings and personnel interviews.  Finally, we provide 
recommended areas for further study. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
We have established that from overall research current 
policies on hazardous material transportation provide 
adequate security for naval bases but some inefficiencies 
do exist. Specific conclusions drawn from research follow. 
1.  Naval bases cannot overlook or relax entrance 
security measures on routine incoming shipments of 
hazardous material from GSA, DLA, or local vendors. 
Security personnel lack access or means to check carriers 
of incoming hazardous material licenses for authorization 
to transport these materials.  Even though a truckload of 
bottled gases is not as dangerous as a truckload of 
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missiles the later can still cause great damage to any 
naval installation.  There are very strict security 
policies in place for transporting missiles.  However, we 
should treat other incoming hazardous material with highest 
precaution in case the shipment was hijacked while in 
transit.  
2. In the past establishing routes for incoming 
hazardous material on base may have not been important but 
this material can become a weapon of mass destruction in 
the wrong hands.  There is a lack of routine and emergency 
routing for incoming hazardous material.  Routing of 
incoming hazardous material is most likely not high on base 
commander’s priority list.  However, many of us did not 
think an aircraft could become a weapon of mass 
destruction.  Some hazardous material can be use by 
terrorist as a weapon of mass destruction.  
3. Detailed base instructions on hazardous material 
management. Many naval bases have detailed instructions or 
procedures on security and management of hazardous material 
operations. Most instructions mainly focus on disposal and 
transportation of hazardous waste.  Base instructions 
normally reference other instructions to follow and many 
times an individual does not have access to these. In 
addition, they are so in dept its time consuming just to 
find a specific subject.  For example, Department of 
Transportation regulations on transporting hazardous 
material would not be on an individual’s desktop. 
4. Naval bases have contingency plans in place for 
possible terrorist attacks.  Most bases have security plans 
and conduct routine exercises in preparation for possible 
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terrorist attacks.  Since September 11th these security 
plans should take in account hazardous material as a 
possible weapon of mass destruction.    
5. Location of on base hazardous material warehouse.  
In the past, military leaders may have not taken into 
account when establishing hazardous material centers for 
storage and distribution their location in proximity of 
potential terrorist targets and populated areas where base 
personnel work. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Naval bases should have access to databases in 
order to check commercial carriers of incoming hazardous 
material for authorized license to transport those 
materials.  Department of transportation has a good system 
in screening applicants applying for licenses to transport 
hazardous material.  State highway patrols can access 
systems to ensure the carriers are authorized to transport 
hazardous material.  However, base security personnel have 
access to only picture identification and assume the 
carrier’s licenses are valid. Security personnel should be 
able to access systems to randomly check carrier’s licenses 
for validation prior to them entering bases. By having 
access to these databases to check carrier’s licenses for 
authorization could prevent and deter possible terrorist 
attacks. 
2. Bases should establish hazardous material routes 
and alternate routes for incoming hazardous material in 
case of an emergency from terrorist attacks. Establishing 
routes for transporting hazardous material for routine 
deliveries and emergencies would help deter and reduce 
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possible destruction of base property and personnel in case 
of a terrorist attack.  
3. Create a desktop guide or incorporate in existing 
base instructions specific procedures or guidance in 
transporting incoming hazardous material. A base 
instruction or desktop guide on procedures or guidance 
summarizing base incoming hazardous material transportation 
would simplify the process.  Additionally, this would 
clearly defined the procedures and be accessible at all 
times when required. 
4. Base security plans should address contingency 
plans in case of a terrorist threat with hazardous 
material. Security plans that exist should cover possible 
terrorist attacks using hazardous material as a weapon of 
mass destruction.  Bases should incorporate security 
exercises that addressed these possible threats.  
5. Hazardous material delivery warehouse and storage 
areas location in reference to the proximity of where 
majority base personnel work and other possible terrorist 
targets should be evaluate prior to establishment.  Bases 
should evaluate the location of where majority of their 
hazardous material is stored or delivery.  The location 
should be separate from areas of possible targets that 
would cause mass destruction if threaten.  If existing 
hazardous material centers are located in these areas of 
potential terrorist targets then relocation of these 
centers should be considered.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. What hazardous materials would most terrorist 
target to project mass destruction to a base installation?  
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These specific materials were not analyzed but their 
potential destruction and cost/benefit analysis for any 
additional security measures would most likely clearly 
identify the most dangerous. Plus, whether base commanders 
should request or allocation more funding to increase in 
security measures for these types of incoming hazardous 
material. 
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